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The regime of foreign investments is built upon an assumption that the sovereignty of host 
states creates an imbalance in the relation between the later and foreign investors. The host state 
being far more powerful than the investor is once the investment agreement is made.1  Hence, the 
need to a legal regime capable of providing foreign investments the adequate protection against a 
possible misusage of a host state’s sovereignty.2 This legal regime covers foreign investments 
wherever a host state exercises sovereignty or jurisdiction, including in maritime zones where host 
states exercise sovereign rights.3   
 
Contrarily to territorial sovereignty, sovereign rights in Exclusive economic zones and 
Continental shelves are functionally limited to the economic exploitation of these zones.4 Moreover, 
in the case of disputed maritime zones these sovereign rights are neither exclusive nor necessarily 
constant. Two claimant States of a single maritime zone are both presumed to be entitled to 
economically exploit the disputed zone until the reaching of a final agreement.5 The exploitation is 
subject to procedural and substantive limitations, which aim to preserve the chances of reaching a 
final delimitation agreement.6  
 
The interaction between the legal regime of foreign investments on the one hand and the legal 
regime of disputed maritime zones on the other hand is not an evident question. Foreign 
investments regime provides foreign investments protection and legal stability within the territory 
of a sovereign host state,7 while the second temporarily governs the competing claims and sovereign 
rights of more than one state. A disputed maritime zone generates rights, which are inherently 
temporary and limited. Nevertheless, states are still expected to provide the investments established 
in these zones the same guarantees they should provide in their territory where they exercise full 
and constant sovereignty.8 
 Hence arises the main question the thesis addresses. If a host state agrees to the 
establishment of an investment in a maritime zone that become later contested, do the occurrence of 
the contestation and the hazards arising from such contestation relief the host state from its 
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This question is driven by concerns regarding how these seemingly opposing regimes 
operates hand in hand.9 Two interests are supposed to coexist in the realm of foreign investments in 
disputed maritime zones, the protection of foreign investments on the one hand and the peaceful 
resolution of maritime disputes. However, the balance between these two interests does not seem 
guaranteed.  
 
Generally, the regime of investment protection has been observed to adopt a tendency to 
prioritize the interests of investors over other rights of host states and the functions of international 
law.10  
 
This tendency is reflected in some overlapping observations. Foreign investors are given 
clear rights through international law by means of investment agreements and customary 
international law. However, it does not seem that foreign investors are bound by clear obligations 
towards host states or under international law.11 Moreover, while states as subjects of international 
law are bound by international legal obligations capable of limiting their capacity to honor their 
contractual agreements, investors are relatively free from such bounds under the assumption that 
they do not have legal personality in international law.12 Accordingly, the obligations arising from 
the investment’s protection regime are often falling on the host state’s side, affecting state’s 
sovereignty and its regulatory authority.13 States capability to enter in international agreements14 as 
well as instigating internal policies15 is perceived to be largely hampered by the fear of conflicting 
with foreign investors’ expectations. 
 
The problems that are noticeable from a political approach are also perceivable from a 
formalist or positivist approach. The inherent nature of disputed maritime zones as areas subjected 
to unstable sovereign rights until the dispute resolution, as well as the hazards which may arise from 
the disputes like possible provisional measures by competent tribunals or the reaching of agreement 
transferring the disputed zone to a contesting state, make the disputed zone permanently subjected 
to events that would qualify as events of force majeure. In fact, investment agreements and 
contracts generally refer to events of that nature as events of force majeure susceptible of precluding 
wrongfulness in case of the un-fulfillment of the party’s obligations.  
 
This paper demonstrates that approached with a traditional interpretation, the concept of force 
majeure as contained in investment agreements and contracts collides with the purpose of 
peacefully settling maritime zonal disputes. Host states become bound by investment agreements 
that might prevent them from providing the necessary concessions in order to resolve their maritime 
disputes. These concessions are required whether in the context of delimitation agreements or in the 
context of governing the overlapping of maritime claims between multiple states.  Moreover, in 
order to benefit from “force majeure” clauses; host states and investors are not obliged by the same 
standards and obligations despite being parties to one investment agreement. States must abide by 
the regulations of the law of the sea in respect of their maritime disputes, while investors are only 
bound by their agreement with the host states. Additionally, the force majeure concept as 
traditionally interpreted is susceptible of discouraging states from adhering to the United Nations 
convention on the law of the sea and its mechanisms of dispute resolution.  
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A host state can be considered to have triggered an event hampering the investment in case of 
a subsequent adherence to the convention or its mechanisms after the establishment of the 
investment if such adherence led to the latter is suspension.  
 
This paper provides an understanding of the force majeure concept that balances the interests 
of private foreign investments on the one hand and the necessities of peaceful resolution of 
maritime disputes on the other hand. It proposes a contextualist and subjective interpretation of the 
concept of force majeure that is based upon what the parties of an agreement have agreed to be 
bound to, according to the provisions of the legal regime governing the exploitation of disputed 
maritime zones and the purpose of peaceful resolution of maritime disputes.  
It provides this understanding using instruments, which are already existent in international 
investment agreements and contracts. Most long-term investments adopt a relaxed approach of the 
force majeure concept. A similar policy can also be traced in some bilateral investment agreements. 
Approaching the force majeure concept from such perspective creates a certain balance between 
investor’s need to legal stability for promoting their investments and state’s need to maneuverability 
to peacefully resolve their maritime disputes.  
 
The first part examines the doctrine of force majeure and its function.  This part is divided 
into three sections; the first deconstructs the concept of force majeure to deduct its elements 
considering its different interpretations in multiple legal systems. The second inspects international 
law instruments, namely bilateral investment treaties’ approach of the concept of force majeure. The 
third studies the common elements of the notion of force majeure in long-term investment contracts, 
focusing on maritime investment contracts.16 This research has been based upon the study of 
twenty-nine maritime investments related contracts. All these contracts are different sorts of 
petroleum agreements. Twenty-six out of them are directly or indirectly related to maritime 
disputes. This sample is widespread on different geographical areas and governing legal systems. 
The relevant areas of these contracts cover disputed maritime zones in the Caribbean Sea, the South 
China Sea, East Mediterranean, West African shores. The investors parties to these contracts are 
resortissants of several nations bounded with the host states by different BITs. Most of these areas 
have witnessed incidents related to maritime disputes that have affected foreign investments. Some 
of these incidents have been brought to investment tribunals17 and some of these maritime disputes 
have been subject to international adjudication.  
 
Part two discusses the qualification of a maritime dispute or contestation as an event of force 
majeure. It demonstrates that different interpretations of each element of the force majeure leads to 
different outcomes in respect of host states’ obligations under the international law of the sea.  The 
first section explains the element of “impossibility to fulfill the obligation” and its relationship with 
the state’s obligation not to hamper the final agreement. section two studies the element of 
exteriority and the state’s duty to precede the economic activity with seeking to enter into a 
provisional agreement. This section analyzes the failure of the state to fulfill this obligation as a 
participation in the rise of the force majeure event. Part three inspects the element of predictability 
in relation to the general rules of delimitation. It addresses the geographical location of the 
investment and its relation to predictability in light the rules of delimitation.  
 
Part three discusses the legal hazards emanating from a maritime contestation. The first 
section examines the qualification of provisional measures banning the economic activity in the 
disputed zone as an event of force majeure. The second section discusses the occurrence of an 
unfavorable delimitation as an event of force majeure. This section proposes a contextualist 
interpretation of force majeure that allows states a greater margin of maneuver to enter into 
delimitation agreements and to adhere to the dispute resolution mechanisms proposed by the United 
Nations convention of the law of the sea.  
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I. FORCE MAJEURE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL 
CONTRACTS 
 
The concept of force majeure is often presented as universal concept in the sense that most 
legal regimes contain a mechanism allowing a party to be exonerated from an obligation if it 
becomes impossible to perform.18 However, the constitutive elements of this concept 
“unforeseeability, irresistibility and impossibility” differ in their interpretation from one legal 
regime to another.19 Some legal regimes retain the three elements while others retain some of them. 
Among the regimes adopting the concept of force majeure or a similar concept, the interpretation of 
each element differs from one another. The governance of foreign investments is subject to several 
legal regimes at a time.20 Host state’s national laws, international law and the investment contract 
constitute the components of the legal regime governing the investment. 
 
 The relationship between a foreign investment and a host state usually begins with 
negotiation then an agreement concerning the establishment of an economic activity or investment 
according to the laws of the host state. However, this contractual relationship does not arise 
unexpectedly. It does not live and operate within a legal vacuum independently from the laws of the 
host state. It is the host state’s national law that regulates the principle of “the autonomy of the 
parties” which give them the relative freedom to enter into a relationship that is governed by their 
own laws, namely the law of the contract. It is also the national law of the host state (unless 
otherwise agreed) that is going to govern the contractual relationship as well as disagreements as the 
interpretation and the fulfillment of the contract’s provision.21  
 
On the other hand, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have become the most important 
instrument of investors/investment protection. They are the main source of international investment 
treaty law.  In contrast with diplomatic protection, these treaties provide investors the possibility of 
raising claims against a sovereign state before international instances without the need of another 
sovereign state to elevate its claim to the international plane. BITs contain the essential means of 
protection of foreign investments and the standards that host states are obliged to follow when 
dealing with the investments belonging to nationals of the other contracting state. These three legal 
instruments govern foreign investments simultaneously. Each one of them governs the relation 
between the investor and the host state before the relevant instance and they can interact with each 
other before the same instance. 
 
Therefore, it becomes impracticable to address the qualification of a maritime dispute as a 
force majeure before establishing a definition of the concept that encompasses its meaning in those 
regimes.22  This section tries to establish an understanding of force majeure that encompasses its 
multiple interpretations in order to reach a universal definition for examining the question of 
investments in disputed maritime zones. The focus of this section is national laws, investment 
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A.  The Concept of Force Majeure and its Elements   
 
The requirements of force majeure are a reflection of the basic principles governing 
contractual performance. The choice of adjectives referring to these elements varies from one 
legal regime to another. For instance, one legal regime uses the word irresistible while another 
would use the word inevitable. It can be argued that regardless of the appellation of the 
elements of the concept of force majeure, they reflect an understanding of the principles of 
contractual performance. These elements can be categorized in two categories. A conduct 
indicating that the party has not assumed the occurrence of the impediment or to perform the 
obligation within a paralyzing context. The second one is related to the characteristics of the 
impediment rendering the performance impossible.  
 
1.  Obligations Assumed by the Parties and the Objective Elements of Force Majeure  
 
A contract or an agreement is an engagement to a specific obligation. Accordingly, 
parties are only bound by the obligations to which they agree to be bound to. The obligations 
and risks a party engage to perform and assume are to be enforced according to principle of 
“pacta sunt servanda”. In contrario, parties should not be held accountable for obligations and 
risks they did not assume at the conclusion of the agreement. According to the adage “no one is 
bound to do the impossible”, the force majeure concept presumes an assumption that the 
parties could not have normally agreed to be bound by a specific obligation if that obligation is 
in fact unrealizable.23 Hence, the most important characteristic of force majeure in most legal 
regimes is the notion of impossibility. The obligation must be rendered impossible to perform 
because of the supervening event. However, the interpretation of the notion of impossibility is 
not a subject of consensus among different legal regimes.24 Impossibility can be interpreted 
objectively by assessing the characteristics of the event in the abstract, regardless of the 
situation of the parties. Accordingly, impossibility exists when it becomes impossible for 
anyone to perform the required obligation. Impossibility can also be interpreted subjectively. 
Accordingly, impossibility exists when it becomes impossible for the party to execute the 
obligation regardless whether could be executed by someone else. An example is Article 275 
of the German Civil Code BGB providing that “the obligation is extinct when its performance 
is impossible for the debtor or anyone else”.25 
 
Another characteristic of force majeure that seems to rely on the idea of assumed 
obligations is the characteristic of un-foreseeability. If a certain event is foreseen at the time of 
conclusion of the agreement, it is assumed that the parties have considered it and assumed to 
bare the occurrence of the event. In that case, the parties are presumed to have implicitly 
agreed either to handle this foreseeable event or to bear the consequences of its occurrence. 
However, nuance is necessary if the foreseeable event renders the performance of the 
obligation objectively impossible. In such cases, most legal regimes consider the contract void 
or null. It seems safe to assume that a degree of un-foreseeability is an inherent constituent of 
force majeure even when the law does not explicitly require it. For instance, despite the fact 
that the old French law hasn’t explicitly required “un-foreseeability” as an element of force 
majeure, the case law has made it a cardinal element of force majeure.26 In contrast, German 
law in article 275 BGB does not put an accent on the notion of un-foreseeability. However, 
even if the accent is not textually placed on foreseeability, it can be said that a relaxed 
requirement of foreseeability is required. Accordingly, subjective foreseeability is considered. 
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The circumstances surrounding the contract and the view of the parties indicate whether they 
have assumed the occurrence of a certain event.  
 
2. The Obligation of Good Faith, Normal Conduct and the Subjective Elements of 
Force Majeure   
 
The other facade of force majeure are the ideas of good faith and attributability. A 
preliminary explanation of the force majeure concept is the absence of a fault attributable to the 
debtor. Accordingly, a party should not be held accountable if no fault is attributed. However, 
faulty actions can take several forms. It can be in the form of an active conduct of the party 
resulting in the occurrence of the event. National laws and commentators use several adjectives 
to describe this requirement; it seems that they all indicate the same idea. For instance, some 
refer to it as (exteriority), other laws and commentators describe it as an event beyond the 
control of the debtor. The difference between the two notions seems to be in the required 
degree of control of the party claiming force majeure. Accordingly, an event falling outside the 
sphere of the debtor’s control or activity cannot qualify as a force majeure if the requirement is 
(exteriority).  
For instance, the illness of the debtor or an internal strike would not be considered as 
exterior to the debtor. The requirement of (control) seems to attenuate the notion of exteriority 
by relying onto a subjective approach (the capacities of the debtor) instead of an abstract 
qualification of the event (the event being within the sphere of the debtor).  
 
The conduct attributing the event or its consequences can also take the form of an 
omission to do what a normal execution of obligations would require for overcoming the 
occurrence of the event or its effects. Therefore, the notion of (control) aside from being used 
to situate the event in or out the debtor’s sphere of control also indicates that the event should 
be the “do” of the debtor nor a consequence of his actions. So does the word “irresistible”. 
Aside from its objective usage to describe the relevant event it also indicates an obligation on 
the debtor to take the necessary means to resist the occurrence or to overcome the 
consequences of the force majeure. These requirements seem to be a natural implication of a 
good faith execution of the contract. If an event arises, which the parties have means to resist 
or overcome and yet do not use these means it is assumed that the parties have not acted in 
good faith. The required effort however should be assessed according to the relevant force 
majeure clause or law as will be examined later.   
 
The conduct’s obligation according to the concept of force majeure does not cease to 
exist with the occurrence of the event. The parties are still expected to overcome the 
consequences of the event. This expectation is indicated by the terms inevitable, irresistible and 
control. The usage of these terms is often not bound by a specific temporal scope; they operate 
to cover the supervening event from its occurrence to its consequences.  
 
3. Objective vs Subjective Approach and the Expansion of Force Majeure  
 
Commentators have tried to find several justifications for the concept of force majeure. 
While some have found it in the risk allocation theory and the (res perit debitori) principle. 27 
Others see its justification as an interpretation a contrario to the principle of (pacta sunt 
servanda).28 Due to this lack of consensus, the definition and elements of force majeure differ 
from one legal system to another. Some legal systems like the French and the Egyptian law 
require the elements of irresistibility, un-foreseeability and exteriority to be existent all 
together.29 Other systems retain only the irresistibility element, while others do not mention un-
foreseeability at all. However, despite this disparity it seems that all these elements and their 
synonyms are constituent of the force majeure concept by virtue of the application of the 
principles of assumed obligations, good faith and attribute-ability.  
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A party is normally bound by the assumed obligations of the contract. Foreseeable 
events susceptible to hampering the execution should normally be in the parties’ mind at the 
time of the contract.  
Normal good faith behavior requires the parties to prevent the occurrence of these 
foreseeable events. It is contrary to the notion of good faith that a party instigates an event 
leading to obstruct the execution of the obligation and finally, a party should seek to honor the 
obligation despite the occurrence of an event obstructing it. In that sense, the traditional 
elements of force majeure overlap in respect their meanings and interpretation.30 The real 
difference however resides in the degree of subjectivity or objectivity retained by each system. 
In contrast with a traditional or objective approach, a relaxed approach of force majeure tends 
to adopt a subjective approach to some of the elements of force majeure or even all the 
elements all together.  
 
It seems however that a development towards a more relaxed or subjective approach to 
excused inexecution in general is becoming the norm among different legal regimes. For 
example, the introduction of the inherently subjective concept of “imprevision”31 in the 
traditionally conservative French civil law32 has been celebrated as a development in contract 
law.33 The new German contract law adopts a subjective notion of foreseeability as well as a 
relative notion of impossibility.34 Accordingly, impossibility is assessed subjectively, but 
impossibility can lead to the termination of the contract if the execution of the obligation 
becomes unbearable for the debtor.  The Norwegian law was traditionally an adept of the strict 
lability principle and therefore limiting the scope of force majeure. In 1988 a new sale of goods 
act implemented the notion of the event “beyond the control” of the debtor.  This trend can also 
be found in multiple international instruments like the CICG and the UNIDROIT principles.  
This general trend of subjectifying the traditionally objective concept of force majeure blurs 
the line separating it from other concepts like hardship and change of circumstances. The 
degree of required foreseeability is not necessarily retained by legal systems in a rigid form. 
The requirement of exteriority or sphere of control can be attenuated to a subjective 
requirement of conduct. Even the cardinal notion of impossibility can move from an absolutist 
approach to a relative one aligned with that of hardship or imprevision, only wider in the sense 
that it is not limited to economic impossibility or impartibility.  
 
The expansion of the scope of application of force majeure leans towards the protection 
of the debtor’s interests. Despite being presented as an application of the principle of “res perit 
debitori”35, the force majeure concept is designed to excuse a failing of performance from the 
side of the debtor. The wider the scope of the force majeure concept, the more protected the 
debtor becomes. In that sense, the contractual balance becomes in favor of the debtor. In 
contrast, the narrower this scope becomes, the more protected becomes the “creditor”. In the 
context of investments in disputed maritime zones, this research focuses on the situation where 
the debtor or the host state fails to execute its obligation (providing permission to work in the 
disputed zone). The different approaches of force majeure can influence this equation; it will 
be discussed further in the next chapter.  
 
On the other hand, this expansion of the application of the “res perit debitori” principle 
in favor of the debtor comes along with more guarantees to the debtor, which helps in 
maintaining the balance of the parties’ interests. National laws and commentators are becoming 
clearer in differentiating between definitive impossibility and partial or temporal impossibility. 
Some commentators proposed to consider “notification of the event of force majeure” as an 
element of the concept of force majeure.  
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33 JOURDAIN-FORTIER AND MIGNOT, supra note 30 at 281–302. 
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35 According to which the debtor should bear the consequences of inexecution.  
International contracts go even further by elaborating detailed clauses on the process of 
negotiating the post-event phase, a process borrowed from the hardship and imprevision 
concept.  
 
B. Force Majeure in International Law 
 
International law constitutes the principal element of the foreign investment’s protection 
regime. It provides foreign investors a layer of protection, which has seen its importance, 
amplified since the first bilateral investment agreement in 1959. Since then, has developed a 
discipline of international economic law, namely the international investment law. The 
development of this discipline has found its strength in a huge amount of jurisprudential 
arsenal that has not stop growing for several decades. The main sources of International 
Investment Law are treaties, costumes and general principles of law.  
 
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have become the most important instrument of 
investors/investment protections.36 They are the main source of international investment treaty 
law.37 In contrast to diplomatic protection, these treaties provide investors the possibility to 
raise claims against a sovereign host state before international instances without the need of 
another sovereign state to elevate its claim to the international plane.38 BITs contain the 
essential means of protection of foreign investments; the standards that host states are obliged 




1. Investment Agreements and the International Customary Law of Force Majeure  
 
As previously, mentioned, international law constitutes a principal layer of protection to 
foreign investments. By means of the substantive guarantees, it provides to these investments, 
as well as the procedural guarantees taking the form of international tribunal’s competence to 
hear the relevant disputes.39  These guarantees can be found in both customary and treaty law, 
the latter taking the ascendant over the former with the proliferation of BITs.40 
 
BITs Like all other binding international treaties creating obligations on states are 
governed by the Vienna convention on the law of treaties41 and they constitute a source of 
international law as stipulated by article 38 of the ICJ statute.42 Therefore, the customary law of 
state responsibility as reflected in the ILC daft articles is applicable to BITs and states are 
responsible for the breach of their provisions. And as the draft articles stipulate the regulation 
of state responsibility, they also demonstrate the circumstances precluding wrongfulness 
namely; force majeure, necessity, distress, consent, counter measures and self-defense.  
 
Article 23 of the ILC Draft Articles addressing force majeure shows that the elements of 
“force majeure” in international law are not different from those known in national laws.43 
Force majeure in international law is an unpredictable or irresistible event that is exterior to the 
will or control of the state and that makes it impossible for the state to perform its international 
obligation. That definition shows that the requirements for an event to be qualified as a force 
majeure are generally the same as those required in national systems.  
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It is worth noticing that Article 27 of the draft articles has left the door opened to 
compensation of the material damages that might occur because of state actions under force 
majeure.44 International law seems to adopt the principle of res perit debitori in the sense that the 
risks are allocated to the debtor of the obligation who would not be able to request the other party to 
fulfill his counter obligation. However, the draft articles seem to avoid the critique made to the risk 
allocation as applied by force majeure in domestic law where the creditor is not entitled to 
compensation for damages in the case of non-performance for force majeure. International law in 
this sense is more balanced in term of risk allocation by permitting the allocation of the risk to both 
parties.  
 
In order to examine how “force majeure” operates in the realm of BITs, it is important first to 
look into the relation between BITs and international customary law as the main source of the 
“force majeure” defense.45 Most commentators agree that International Investment Law is not a 
self-contained regime,46 in fact, BITs are the product of international law and they remain governed 
by international law as an international treaty.47 Unless contained by a lex-specialis, customary 
international law remains the law of the treaty upon which the interpretation and the application of 
the treaty relies.48 It is also relied upon to fill the vacuum that left by the provision of a given 
treaty.49The most relevant example is the rules of state responsibility governing the obligations by 
which the states party to a treaty are bound and the consequences of breaches to these obligations as 
well the circumstances precluding wrongfulness. 
 
2. Non-Precluded Measures in Bilateral Investment Agreements  
 
Some BITs contain what are known as “non-precluded measures” clauses or NPM 
clauses. Generally, the NPM clause is the mechanism by which a State party to a BIT can rely on 
to take measures that would be otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of the BIT.50Despite 
that, the number of BITs containing such clause are relatively small, they are still important 
enough to be considered.51 Especially that this type of clauses has attracted the interest of 
commentators, being a major component of the cardinal cases known as “the Argentinian gas 
cases”.52  In our examination of this clause the focus on the Argentine – USA BIT clause will be 
as a model clause, on one hand because of the interest it has attracted during and after the 
Argentinian cases, and on the other hand because of its wide scope and the vagueness of its 
wording are prone to conflictual interpretation as shown by the Argentinian experience.  
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Necessity: Unanswered Questions and Future Implications of Annulments in the Argentine Gas Cases, 23 
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51 see WILLIAM W. BURKE-WHITE and ANDREAS VON STADEN, supra note 50 at 314“Of the 2000 
BITs presently in force, NPM clauses appear in at least 200 such treaties.” 
52 In response of its major financial crisis of 2001, Argentina has taken severe financial measures, which led 
to a wave of more than forty cases brought against it before ICSID tribunals. Among the first cases to be filed 
were the four cases filed by the four American gas companies; CMS, Enron, Sempra and LG&E. Four 
different tribunals had to examine the alleged breach of Argentina to the USA – Argentina BIT, as well as the 
Argentinian defense of necessity under both customary law and article XI of the BIT.  
The most interesting feature of the “Argentinian gas cases” is that they all rely on the same factual 
grounds, the same Argentina – USA BIT, the claimants have made more or less very close claims in 
respect of the alleged violation of the BIT and finally, Argentina relied of the same defense in all 
the cases, namely the necessity defense under article XI of the Argentina – USA bilateral 
investment agreement and customary law. Therefore, it was a rare occasion where it could be 
observed how several arbitral bodies would work on practically the same case and interpret NPM 
clauses simultaneously.53 
 
a.  Examples of Non-Precluded Measures Clauses  
 
The wording of the NPM clause differs from one BIT to another.54 For instance, the 
Germany – China BIT stipulates that “ Measures that have to be taken for reasons of public 
security and order, public health or morality shall not be deemed ‘treatment less favorable’ 
within the meaning of Article 3” [article 3 contains the most favored nation standard of treatment 
].55 
 
The Belgium / Luxemburg economic (BLEU) union and Montenegro treaty includes an 
NPM clause in article 3 stating as following “Except for measures required to maintain public 
order, such investments shall enjoy continuous protection and security, i.e. excluding any 
unjustified or discriminatory measure which could hinder, either in law or in practice, the 
management, maintenance, use, possession or liquidation thereof”56. 
 
A similar clause is also found in article 11 of the India – UK BIT stipulating the following 
“(I) Subject to the provisions ·of this Agreement, all investment shall be governed by the laws in 
force in the territory of the Contracting Party in which such investments are made. (2) 
Notwithstanding paragraph (I) of this Article nothing in this Agreement precludes the host 
Contracting Party from taking action for the protection of its essential security interests or in 
circumstances of extreme emergency in accordance with its laws normally and reasonably 
applied on a non-discriminatory basis.”57 
 
Comparing the above-mentioned clauses with the USA – Argentina BIT, some 
commentators have noted the difference between them in respect to the required circumstances 
triggering this clause.58 It seems that the most important difference resides in the scope of each 
clause.59 The German and the Belgium BITs limit the scope of their respective NPM clauses to 
attenuate only specific provisions of the BIT (BLEU limiting the scope of “protection and 
security” clause and the German limiting the scope of the “less favorable nation” clause).60 
Therefore, there is very little ground for arguing that a circumstance mentioned in these NPM 
lead to the suspension of the whole BIT. 
Article XI of the USA – Argentina BIT provides that “This Treaty shall not preclude the 
application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the 
fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace 
or security, or the Protection of its own essential security interests”.  
 
The article contemplated the cases where it would be triggered. These cases are the 
maintenance of public order, fulfilling the state’s obligations in respect to the maintenance of 
international peace and security and finally, the preservation of its essential national interests. 
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The wording of article XI is general and wide enough to sustain a claim that it is establishing a 
general rule or regime the preclusion of wrongfulness. 
 
There is however, no consensus on whether this article constitutes a “lex-specialis” or 
whether it is a mere reflection of costmary international law as reflected in the ILC draft articles 
on state responsibility. 
 
b.  Non-Precluded Measures and International Customary Law  
 
The tribunals in Sempra, CMS, Enron and LG&E have all agreed that Argentina’s 
measures in response of its economic crisis constituted a violation of the provisions of the USA 
– Argentina BIT. The issue is to determine if Argentina is liable for these violations or if they 
were excused according to customary law on necessity or the NPM clause. CMS considered the 
NPM clause as a reflection of customary law and therefore, it referred to the element of necessity 
in customary law to assess the Argentinian defense.61 
 
 Enron and Sempra refused to consider article XI “lex-specialis”. In the view of both 
tribunals, the lack of specific requirements to invoke the state of necessity and the article’s only 
stipulating cases or circumstances to preclude wrongfulness in respect of the BIT means that it is 
necessary to look for these requirements in customary law.62  
LG&E tribunal’s accepted Argentina’s claim and considered article XI to be a “lex-
specialis”, accordingly the tribunal found that the Argentinian measures were within the scope of 
this article and decided that Argentina didn’t commit any breach to the BIT.  
 
c. Non-Precluded Measures, a Grandfather Clause of Force Majeure 
 
Most commentators address the NPM clause in accordance with the defense of “necessity” 
whether based on customary law or a treaty provision.63  It seems the NPM clause has been 
taken hostage of the Argentinian cases and the Argentinian defense of necessity. This situation 
led most commentators who have approached this subject to examine it as a necessity clause or 
at least a clause to be studied within the necessity conditions and requirements. This tendency 
might be due the fact that the tribunals of the Argentinian cases have discussed article XI of the 
BIT through its relation to customary law on necessity without looking at it as a wider rule on 
state responsibility and preclusion and wrongfulness.64 It is also possible that the impression of 
an organic relation between the NPM clause in a BIT and the “necessity defense” in customary 
law is the usage of the word (necessary measures) to stipulate the article.65 That is despite the 
fact that the normal meaning of the word (necessary) is not necessarily the equivalent of 
“necessity” as a legal concept, which has a narrower, meaning due to the conditions required to 
be acknowledged as such. 
 
There is no claim that widening the perspective of looking to NPM clauses would have 
necessarily changed the outcome of any of the Argentinian cases which is not going to be a 
subject of an in-depth examination here, being deeply examined elsewhere.66  
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However, that a wider understanding of NPM clause would have been of more 
contribution to the understanding of state responsibility in the realm of investment agreements.  
It is now clear how different tribunals and commentators differ in their analysis of the 
nature of the NPM clause. That each opinion relies on plausible arguments. To consider the 
NPM clause as a mere reflection of customary law discharges the interpretation process from the 
principle of effectivity as a rule of interpretation.67 Interpretation must give meaning and effect 
to all terms of a treaty; an interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing 
whole clauses or paragraphs to redundancy or inutility.68  It seems inadequate to consider a 
clause stipulated by the parties of an agreement as void of a given meaning they both meant, that 
is unless they have both made this presumed reference clear.69 Otherwise, it is imperative to 
determine the meaning wanted by the parties without widening the interpretation or narrowing it 
to the extent of disregarding the intent of the state’s parties when the agreement was made.  
On the other hand, to consider the NPM clause as a contained system that is independent 
and self-reliant is a broad interpretation that is sustained neither by the purposes of the BIT, nor 
by the explicit stipulation of the clause. A BIT (and there is nothing to sustain that Argentina US 
is an exception) means to protect the investments of both parties made in the other party’s 
territory, broadening the scope of the NPM clause leads to limit the scope of application of the 
BIT to normal and regular times, while removing un-regular circumstances and times out of the 
scope of application of the BIT. This seems a radical interpretation that goes against to the 
purpose of A BIT which is normally to provide foreign investments a layer of protection that is 
independent of the national legal and political regime and that ensures a certain stability and 
certainty to foreign investments. Furthermore, nothing prevents states from explicitly limiting 
the scope of application of their BIT to regular times, which is in fact a policy followed by a 
number of states in respect to their BITs.  
 
Nevertheless, this is not a reason to disregard the article or to reduce it to redundancy. 
Article XI of the Argentinian – USA BIT denominates the circumstances that trigger the clause; 
however, it does not define any of these circumstances and their features, nor the conditions of 
the measures that states are entitled to take upon the existence of these circumstances. Giving 
this vacuum, I do not think that considering article XI as a “lex specialis” necessarily lead to a 
negation to the role of customary law as the general law of interpretation. 
 
The ILC Draft Articles have determined the required elements of force majeure. They also 
require “impossibility” as the main effect. However, it is hard to claim that exists a uniform 
conception of the notion of impossibly as a general principle of law. Some national laws have 
adopted a narrow definition of force majeure while other have expanded it. Generally, 
impossibility means (the absolute impossibility of performance) not merely to be extremely 
difficult or onerous. Article XI seems to establish a lower threshold in respect of the meaning of 
impossibility in the realm of the USA - Argentina BIT.  
 
The circumstances mentioned by the article (international peace and security for example) 
are all of such a nature where it is hard to determine if it is possible for a state to overcome them 
or even to determine the proper means of overcoming them. For instance, it is obvious how the 
tribunals in the Argentinian cases have agreed that Argentina was facing a major economic crisis 
and that the crisis was not imputable to Argentina. Even the tribunals that dismissed Argentina’s 
defense of necessity considered the crisis when assessing compensation. Nevertheless, they have 
differed as to whether the measures taken by Argentina were “the” necessary measures to face its 
crisis. Taking article XI into consideration in respect to “force majeure”, the article stipulates a 
list of events or circumstances forming a threshold to instigate a non-compliance system that the 
treaty omitted to mention.  
                                                          
67 see Id. at 323.; World Court and United Nations Charter: The Principle of Effectiveness in Interpretation, , 
1962 DUKE LAW J. 85 (1962). 
68 White, Gillian --- "Treaty Interpretation: The Vienna Convention 'Code' as Applied by the World Trade 
Organisation Judiciary" [1999] AUYrBkIntLaw 17; (1999) 20 Australian Year Book of International Law 319 
69 On the question of ascertaining the meaning of a specific BIT provision see WILLIAM W. BURKE-WHITE 
and ANDREAS VON STADEN, supra note 11 at 384, Russian delegation negotiating a BIT with the USA 
insisted on explicitly affirming the self-judging character of the NPM Clause in a protocol.   
 
The non-compliance system known in customary law is the “circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness” as reflected in the ILC draft articles. One of these circumstances is “force 
majeure”. The ILC articles set the elements and requirements of force majeure but they do not 
prevent states from modifying these requirements in their own agreements. One of the common 
ways to modify or to relax the elements of “force majeure” clauses is to include an exhaustive or 
non-exhaustive list of events upon which an interpreter can rely to deduce the notion of force 
majeure as intended by the parties. This private law approach seems to be the approach by which 
Sempra and Enron tribunal tackled this issue. By doing so, these tribunals opened a space for 
arguing that NPM clauses can have the same function of “lists of events” in international 
contracts as will be seen in the following section.  
 
 
C. Force Majeure in International Contracts 
 
“Force Majeure” clauses are a recurrent feature in most international contracts and 
investment agreements.70  Given that, the investment relationship is going to be long and 
potentially with many legal and political changes.  Even in civil law countries where “force 
majeure” is already defined by law, the parties to an investment contract tend to design their 
own force majeure clause adapted to their needs.71 This practice is sustained by the fact that the 
“force majeure” concept is not of public order in most legal systems, therefore parties are free 
to design their own “force majeure” regime.72 In common, law countries where the doctrine of 
“force majeure” does not exist, it becomes primordial for the parties to insert it in their 
contract.  
 
The “force majeure” clause function is to anticipate the occurrence of an event of force 
majeure during the execution of the contract. Generally, this clause contains the definition73  of 
“force majeure” or the hypothesis upon which it rests,74 the effects of the occurrence of an 
event of force majeure to be considered as such,  and it can also contain the modalities of it’s a 
activation .75 Sometimes, the “force majeure” clause defines its scope of application by 
precluding certain obligation from being covered by such defense76 or even by eliminating the 
executory effect of force majeure in certain cases.77  
 
 
The ideal drafted force majeure clause must contain the definition, effects and modalities 
of “force majeure” as conceived by the parties to be able to be fully effective.78 However, some 
clauses define force majeure only by inserting an illustrating list of events.79  
 
 
For example, the “force majeure” clause in this “Philippine / shell” contract stipulates 
the following: “a) Any failure or delay …… shall be excused to the extent attributable to force 
majeure b) (provides the modalities of extension of the contract in case of force majeure) c) 
force majeure shall include act of God, unavoidable accidents, acts of war or conditions arising 
out of or attributed to war declared or undeclared, laws, rules, regulations and orders … “80 
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The illustrative list should serve as guidance to deduce (or in other cases to sustain an 
already defined notion of force majeure) the characteristics of “force majeure” as meant by the 
parties. For instance, a list containing events of an “act of god” might indicate that the parties 
refer to a traditional notion of force majeure. Nevertheless, this technique seems to be defective 
as it often complicated to deduce the elements of force majeure from such lists. Most 
importantly, the events stipulated in an exhaustive list cannot qualify as “force majeure” unless 
they have the characteristics of force majeure.81 For instance, if a list contains “war” as an 
example of a force majeure, a party cannot claim “force majeure” when a war happens if it 
does not affect the performance of the obligation. 
 
1. Defining Force Majeure Clauses by Reference  
 
Some clauses define force majeure with reference to a certain legal regime. It can be the 
national law of the contract or another legal instrument.82 Some clauses do not contain an 
illustrative list nor a definition of force majeure and the elements upon which force majeure 
should be assessed.83 In this case, the clause settles with mentioning the applicable regime and 
effects if a force majeure occurs.84  For instance, the “force majeure” clause in the contract made 
between Cameroon’s Société Nationale des hydrocarbure / Perenco oil / Kosmos energy 
provides the following “ For the purposes of this Agreement, Force Majeure means any act of 
God, perils of navigation, storm, flood, earthquake, lightning, explosion, fire, hostilities, war 
(declared or undeclared), blockade, insurrection, civil commotion, acts of public enemy, 
quarantine restriction, epidemics, accident, riot, strike or labor disturbance, any act or failure to 
act of a Governmental agency or local body (provided such act or failure to act is the proximate 
cause of non-performance or delay in performance of any obligation under this Agreement or the 
exercise of any right dependent thereon) or any other cause beyond the control of any affected 
Party.”85 
 
In this clause, the parties rely on an illustrative list to refer to “force majeure”. In such 
cases, it seems reasonable to assume that the national law or the applicable law of the contract on 
the characteristics of force majeure would apply.86 
 
2. Clauses Defining Force Majeure with an Abstract Definition  
 
 Generally, clauses in long-term contracts define force majeure in a traditional way by 
stipulating the three usual element or characteristics of force majeure being irresistibly, 
unpredictability and exteriority. Such clause can be found in the Cypriot model of “production 
sharing agreement” stipulating that “For purposes of this Contract, cases of Force Majeure are 
considered to include all events which are unforeseeable, irresistible and beyond the control of 
the Party which invokes it, such as earthquake, riot, insurrection, civil disturbances, acts of war 
or acts attributable to war. The intent of the Parties is that the term Force Majeure shall be 
interpreted in accordance with the principles and practice of international law.”87 
 
Most clauses contain a definition of force majeure as well as an illustrative list of events.88 
In such cases, the illustrative list might help to sustain the already defined notion of force 
majeure. When parties define the notion of “force majeure”, they are free to emphasize a given 
element while relaxing another.  
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3. Clause Reconfiguring the Requirements of Force Majeure  
 
In some cases, parties use clauses that broaden or tighten the definition of force majeure 
according to the specificities and characteristics of their investment.89 Some contracts contain 
clauses that relax the traditionally required elements of force majeure or emphasize one of these 
elements. Such clauses help parties to adapt the force majeure clause to the nature of their 
economic activity as well as the geopolitics of a given host state.  
 
a. Un-Foreseeability  
 
In the case of a long-term investment in a geopolitically hazardous location, parties might 
feel the need to relax the notion of un-foreseeability. It is clear that un-foreseeability despite 
being a traditional element of force majeure is subject to legislative and jurisprudence traction on 
the national level. The practice of attenuating “un-foreseeability” is therefore not foreign to legal 
drafting in general. In the following clause from this contract between Ghana’s GNPC / ENI and 
others, the parties omitted to expressly require un-foreseeability "Force Majeure" means any 
event beyond the reasonable control of the Party claiming to be affected by such event which has 
not been brought about directly or indirectly at its own instance or which has not been brought 
about directly or indirectly at the instance of an Affiliate. Force Majeure events may include, but 
are not limited to, acts of God, accidents, fires, explosions, earthquake, storm, flood, hurricanes, 
tidal waves, cyclones, tornados, lightning or other adverse weather conditions or any other 
natural disasters, war, acts of war, acts of terrorism, embargo, blockade, riot, civil disorder, or 
strike”.90 In other clauses parties could require that to qualify as a force majeure, an event must 
not be “reasonably foreseeable”91 
 
b. Irresistibility and Sphere of Control  
 
The relaxation or relativization can also extend to the unavoidability or the irresistibility 
of an event.92 The party must not have passively contributed to its occurrence by not taking 
adequate measures to prevent it or to surmount its effects.93 The event qualifying as a force 
majeure must not be attributed to the party that is claiming it. The party must not have actively 
contributed by its conduct to the occurrence of the event. This requirement is also referred to as 
the exteriority element. 
 
The force majeure clause indicates whether the obligation to prevent the force majeure is 
an absolute or relative obligation. Whether any measure exists to surmount the effects, or the 
occurrence of a given event and whether the party is capable of taking these measure (or making 
the proper effort) are two separate questions.  
The usage of phrases such as “reasonably” or “beyond reasonable control” indicates that 
the parties mean to relax the notion of unavoidability.94  
 
This clause for example provides that “Force Majeure” means an event, other than the 
obligation to pay money (unless payment is prohibited by government instruction or order as 
noted below), which could not reasonably be expected to have been prevented or controlled and 
is beyond the ability of the affected Party to control using reasonable efforts…”95  Another 
example can be found in this clause from a contract between Guyana and CGX resources 
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stipulating that “ In this Article, the term "force majeure" shall mean any event beyond the 
reasonable control of the Party claiming to be affected by such event…”96 
 
 
A similar clause can also be found in the contract between Grenada and RSM stating 
“force majeure” means any event beyond the reasonable control of the party claiming to be 
affected by such event which has not been brought about at its instance and which has caused 
such non-performance or delay in performance”97 
 
c. Impossibility and the Effects of an Event of Force Majeure  
 
National laws are not uniform in their conception of the “impossibility” of performance. 
Some legal systems opt for a narrow interpretation of impossibility requiring it to be absolute, 
while other systems opt for a wider concept that only requires impossibility to be relative. 
Similarly, contract clauses can strengthen and relax the element of impossibility according to 
each contract necessity. For instance, the following clause indicates the relaxation of the element 
of impossibility, “If either party is prevented from or delayed in carrying out any of the 
provisions of this Agreement by reason of ... [enumeration of events] " ... or any cause beyond 
its control making it impossible or exorbitant from an industrial or commercial standpoint to 
perform its obligations hereunder .... “98    
 
This clause has explicitly relaxed the required threshold for an event to qualify as 
rendering performance impossible. Some commentators note that such clauses remove the 
difference between “force majeure” and “hardship”. These clauses coincide with the practice of 
some national laws aiming to relax the concept of force majeure. However, the event must be 
near to crippling the party’s capability to perform their obligations.  
 
The traditional effect of force majeure is to liberate the party from the obligation 
becoming impossible to perform and exonerating the party from responsibility of non-
performance. Parties who are keen on the survival of the investment contract (which is often the 
case in long-term investment agreements) include a suspensive effect to the force majeure 
clause.99 Accordingly, the obligation is only “temporarily” suspended as long as the force 
majeure event is temporary or surmountable.100 That entails an obligation of due diligence or 
best effort onto the parties to surmount the event of force majeure and its effect. In the latter case 
however, the parties must have adopted a rather relaxed definition of the element of 
impossibility being in that case a surmountable event despite its rigorousness.  
 
4. Common Features of Force Majeure Clauses in Long Term Investment Contracts  
 
The first observation to be made in respect to international maritime investment 
contracts is the fact that “force majeure” clauses seem to constitute an important and common 
element in practically all these contracts. The “force majeure” regime is always mentioned in 
the contract whether it is by reference to a given legal system or by a special design stipulated 
by the contract. Most of the contracts studied for the purpose of this research seem to abandon 
the requirement of “un-foreseeability” as an element of “force majeure” as well as adopting a 
relaxed notion of irresistibility and impossibility of performance101 . 
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Very few contracts retain the element of un-foreseeability either by explicitly requiring 
it102 or by referring to a national law adopting un-foreseeability as a required element of force 
majeure.103 The reason behind the adoption of a relaxed notion of “force majeure” might 
resides in two element. First, the longevity of the investments, which makes it, complicated to 
foresee events that might happen in years or maybe decades. Second is the fact that most of the 
studied contracts are performed in either maritime areas that are disputed or are related to a 
disputed area. The different implications of such clauses in the case of a maritime dispute will 
be further addressed in the following parts.  
 
 
II. MARITIME DISPUTES AS EVENT OF FORCE MAJEURE: THE 
SUPERVENIENCE OF A ZONAL CONTESTATION 
 
The previous part has demonstrated that the concept of force majeure is a flexible concept 
that can be interpreted rigidly or flexibly according to the relevant legal regime. The elements of 
this concept are designed differently, according to the context into which they are supposed to 
operate. Each interpretation of each element of the force majeure concept can affect the party’s 
obligations and required conduct within the specific context of their investment agreement or 
contract. This part will apply the different interpretations of the elements of force majeure on the 
elements of maritime zonal disputes. It will demonstrate that different constructions of the elements 
of foreseeability, irresistibility and the notion of impossibility can change the outcome when 
defining whether a maritime zonal dispute qualifies as a force majeure event. 
  
Coastal states in dispute are both entitled to explore and exploit the disputed area. It is legally 
presumed that both states may claim the relevant rights over the contested zone.104 However, this 
right is conditioned by procedural105 and substantive conditions. 
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Paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 of the UNCLOS reads as follows: “Pending 
[delimitation]... the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every 
effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional 
period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement”.106 The text do not prevent 
the exploitation or exploration of a disputed area, on the contrary, it creates a framework of 
procedural and substantive elements to organize the economic activity of the states in dispute. States 
claiming a given maritime zone are both entitled to explore and exploit it. They just become under 
an obligation of restrain while practicing their right. The restraint obligation is reflected in articles 
74(3) and 83(3) of the convention, which impose an obligation of conduct on both states as well as a 
limitation of the permissible activities.  
 
A dispute over a maritime zone in the sense of the law of sea is an event created by a state’s 
“contestation” of another state’s claim that imposes an “obligation of conduct” on claiming states 
and renders “illegal” or impermissible the performance of some kinds of economic activities. In the 
language of the concept of force majeure, a maritime dispute can be a “supervening” event 
rendering the parties’ obligations in the realm of an investment agreement “illegal / impossible” by 
activating the provisions of articles 74(3) and 83(3).  This event in order to create the possible 
“illegality” provided by these provisions must satisfy three elements. First, a contestation must 
occur. Second, contesting states must fail to abide by the obligation of conduct provided by articles 
74 and 83. Third the economic activity must be of a nature which jeopardizes the reach of a final 
agreement and therefore un-permissible.  
 
In order to determine whether a maritime dispute is a “force majeure” these elements must be 
deconstructed and analyzed separately to determine if they satisfy the required elements of “force 
majeure” (unpredictability, irresistibility) and it has the effect required to qualify an even as a force 
majeure, which is rendering performance “illegal / un-permissible”.  
 
 
A. The Regime Governing the Economic Exploitation of Undisputed and Disputed 
Maritime Zones   
 
This section begins with a discussion of the regime governing the economic exploitation 
of maritime zones to identify the inherent sovereign rights of costal states upon their maritime 
zones.  
 
1. The Economic Exploitation of Undisputed Maritime Zones  
  
Coastal states are entitled to an exclusive economic zone that extend to 200 nautical miles 
from their baseline.107 Sovereign rights over a maritime zone differs from sovereignty over land. 
The latter requires physical presence and effective control over land, the former is merely 
dependent on a claim of the concerned coastal state.108 In this sense, a state’s rights upon its EEZ 
is merely a legal assertation rather than a factual reality. UNCLOS has given coastal states the 
exclusive right to explore and exploit their exclusive economic zones. These rights are an 
inherent constituent of the right to an exclusive economic zone. The powers of coastal states 
however may not exceed the necessities of exercising these rights.109  
 
 
                                                          
106 UNCLOS, , http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf (last visited 
Nov 10, 2017). 
107 Id. article 57. 
108 - Brilmayer and - Klein, supra note 4. 
109 see Y. TANAKA, A DUAL APPROACH TO OCEAN GOVERNANCE: THE CASES OF ZONAL AND INTEGRATED 
MANAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (2016); - Brilmayer and - Klein, supra note 88; Angela 
Del Vecchio Capotosti, In Maiore Stat Minus : A Note on the EEZ and the Zones of Ecological Protection in 
the Mediterranean Sea, 39 OCEAN DEV. INT. LAW 287–297, 287–297 (2008); Robert C. Beckman & Clive H. 
Schofield, Defining eez Claims from Islands: A Potential South China Sea Change, 29 INT. J. MAR. COAST. 
LAW 193–243, 193–243 (2014); DANIEL J. DRUZEK ET AL., PARTING THE RED SEA: BOUNDARIES, OFFSHORE 
RESOURCES AND TRANSIT (2001). 
 
The cornerstone of the economic legal regime of exclusive economic zones is article 56 of 
the UNCLOS III which provides the following:    
 
“1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state has: (a) Sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether 
living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and 
with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as 
the production of energy from the water, currents and winds” 
 
The examples provided by this article are not exhaustive. State’s sovereign rights extend 
to all kinds of economic activities using the resources of the EEZ. As some commentators have 
noted, the drafters of UNCLOS could not anticipate at the time of the elaboration of the text all 
the possible ways of exploiting the maritime resources.110 Therefore, the language of the treaty 
came general to encompass future activities that would fall within the scope of “economic 
exploitation”.   
 
In order to exercise their sovereign rights upon their EEZ, States are entitled to construct 
installations and structures for economic purposes.111 UNCLOS has also granted coastal states 
the right to build artificial islands and other installations that interfere with the exercise of their 
accorded rights. Coastal states are also entitled to jurisdiction on these structures and 
installations. 
 
Third states continue to enjoy the right of freedom to use and navigate the exclusive 
economic zones of the coastal state through all means that are lawful and do not prevent the 
coastal state of exercising its sovereign rights. The UNCLOS balances between the need to 
exploit the natural resources of waters beyond territorial waters and the established rights of all 
nations such as the free navigation in oceans.112 It is not random that the convention tries to 
regulate state’s sovereign rights on their exclusive economic zones in a manner that do not 
prevent third states from enjoying their rights of free navigation, overflight and the laying of 
submarine cables.  
 
The UNCLOS requires costal states not to interfere with these rights while exercising their 
exclusive rights within their EEZ. For instance, coastal states are required to notify of any 
installation of structure to be built the requirement as well to maintain and the removal of 
abandoned structures.  
On the other hand, costal states are entitled to maintain a reasonable safety zone around 
installations and islands that all ships must respect. The only aspect of freedom of navigation 
that prevails over costal states sovereign rights is non-interference with recognized sea-lanes 
essential to international navigation.113  
 
2. The Economic Exploitation of Disputed Maritime Zones  
 
In some cases, coastal states entitlement to an exclusive economic zone interferes with the 
same right of another state. For example, when the distance between the shores of two costal 
states is less than 400 nautical miles. In that case, until a delimitation occurs, if the relevant 
states make overlapping claims over a certain area, a legal presumption exists that both states are 
entitled and may claim the relevant sovereign rights upon the same disputed zone made in bona 
fida.  
 
Articles 74(3) and 83(3) are the main instrument of UNCLOS regulating the economic 
exploitation and exploration of exclusive economic zones and continental shelves where 
overlapping claims interact. The adopted regime is a merge of two different approaches 
regarding the exploitation of contested maritime zones that competed during the discussions 
preceding UNCLOS III.  
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Some states proposed a suspension of economic activities in disputed areas and others 
proposed the requirement of provisional arrangement pending final agreement.114 The 
convention took elements from both approaches. On one hand, the prevention of some activities 
susceptible of hampering the final decision. On the other hand, the requirement that states should 
seek provisional arrangements.115 Two interests ought to be protected in this schema. On the one 
hand, permitting the economic exploitation of the disputed area and on the other preserving the 
residual rights of the state to which the disputed zones are granted after the delimitation. Articles 
74 and 83 are to provide a balance between these two interests. In sum, it can be said that a 
dispute over a given maritime zone creates procedural and substantive limitations on the 
economic activity while expanding the concept of exclusivity to encompass both claiming states.  
 
B. Maritime Zonal Contestation as a Force Majeure Event  
 
The following section will examine the procedural and substantive requirements 
governing the economic exploitation of disputed maritime zones in more depth. The examination 




The foreseeability of a maritime contestation is the primary element to be determined in 
order to establish whether the contestation satisfies the requirements of force majeure. As 
mentioned previously, the element of foreseeability extends to both the occurrence of the event 
as well as to its consequences. In the context of maritime zonal disputes, both the contestation 
and the consequent illegality or un-permissibility arising from this contestation must be 
unpredictable. Maritime zonal disputes arise initially from a lack of delimitation that supersedes 
the overlap of claims. However, the overlap of claims is not a fatal consequence of the lack of 
delimitation. It is therefore not necessary to predict an overlap of claims upon the mere lack of 
delimitation. Moreover, the lack of delimitation is not as such a decisive element in the 
prediction of a subsequent illegality or un-permissibility of a certain economic activity. Finally, 
the rules and factors governing delimitation in international law must be taken into consideration 
to assess if a contestation is predictable or not.  
 
 
a. The Difference between Undelimited Zones and Disputed Zones 
 
Each coastal state is entitled to an exclusive economic zone up to 200 nm. States define 
their maritime spaces by unilaterally establishing the limits of their maritime zones.116 However, 
if these spaces are in contact with the space of another state, the sovereign rights of these states 
are considered overlapping. The resolution of this contact requires a delimitation between the 
concerned states. Hence, the difference between limitation and delimitation resides in the first 
being a national act and the second being an international act whether in form of agreement of a 
judicial decision.117 
 
The lack of delimitation is not the corollary of a zonal dispute. The maritime zonal dispute 
being an overlap of claims over a defined area arises only when both states make their claims 
resulting in the contestation of each other’s claimed zone. The wording of articles 74 and 83 
“pending agreement” creates uncertainty as to whether the obligations required by the articles 
are triggered by the mere lack of delimitation or by an overlap of claims.118 The latter 
interpretation seems more adequate for practical considerations. There is no reason to assume an 
obligation of restraint on behalf of a coastal state whose maritime claim is not challenged by 
another state.  
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It is also not conceivable that a state’s economic activity in a claimed maritime zone that 
is uncontested hampers or jeopardizes reaching a final agreement that would not eventually 
encompass the relevant zone. The tribunal’s reasoning in both Ghana vs Cote d’ivoire and 
Suriname vs Guyana indicates that the tribunals adopted the criteria of “overlapping claims” to 
deduce the scope of the dispute. In the first case, the tribunal begins the assessment of the 
legality of Ghana’s conduct by determining Ghana’s knowledge of the existence of a dispute. 
The lack of delimitation was not enough to determine such knowledge; in fact, the tribunal relied 
on previous correspondence between the two states indicating that specific areas were being 
disputed between the parties.119   
 
Accordingly, the maritime zones falling outside the geographical scope of the claim of the 
other state cannot be considered disputed despite the lack of an official delimitation. 120 
Unilateral activity in an un-delimited area falling outside the geographical scope of another 
state’s contestation is not governed by the obligations provided by articles 74 and 83.121  
 
 
b. The Geographical Scope of a Potential Contestation in Case of Lack of Delimitation  
 
The lack of a delimitation between two or more maritime zones in contact is susceptible to 
the creation of overlapping claims. The unsurmountable geography that makes it impossible for 
a state to claim a 200 nm area imposes on states the duty to make their claims upon different 
criteria and in good faith. The question is to determine the criteria upon which a state might 
formulate its claim in the absence of the applicability of the 200 NM rule. To answer this 
question, it is necessary to observe the law of maritime delimitation of overlapping maritime 
zones as reflected in jurisprudence and state practice, to determine what the scope of a state’s 
claim and the potential area that might be disputed might be.  
 
c.  The Prevalence of the Equidistance Approach and Other Factors of Delimitation 
 
Articles 74(1) and 83(1) Of the UNCLOS provides “The delimitation of the exclusive 
economic zone/continental shelf with the opposite or adjacent coasts shell be effected by 
agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.”122  
 
 However, the convention does not provide a specific method for determining how a 
delimitation is made.123 The methodology of maritime delimitation grew out of jurisprudence 
that began with the North Sea Continental Shelf case.124  It is safe to affirm that established a 
corrective – equity approach to maritime delimitation has now been established.125 This 
approach consists of a delimitation based upon three stages. The First stage is the establishment 
of a median line or an equidistant line between the base points of each state. The Second stage is 
a shift of this median line if relevant (geographical and non-geographical) circumstances justify 
it. The most important factors that are commonly retained by international tribunals are the 
configuration of the coasts and the coasts length.  The third stage is a general test of equity, 
which is applied to determine whether the result of the first two stages is equitable.  
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This method, despite giving tribunals a margin of appreciation that is based upon 
predictable factors like the geographical factors has the advantage of retaining a degree of 
predictability by incorporating the equidistance approach.126  
 
 
d. The Predictability of a Zonal Contestation   
 
Looking at it from an absolutist approach, a force majeure event is always predictable. To 
predict an event is to foresee the future according to an analysis of what is naturally, socio-
politically and legally possible. Accordingly, only events that seem at the moment of making the 
contract impossible to happen can be qualified as force majeure. Therefore, a strike or a typhoon 
being a natural event, which occurs in nature in the abstract, cannot qualify as a force majeure. 
Following this logic, a contestation of a maritime area belonging to a state who has not delimited 
its maritime areas is always possible and therefore cannot be an unforeseeable event.  However, 
as a commentator has noted, the law cannot ask someone to be a superhuman who can predict 
what is unpredictable.127 Therefore, national laws do not adopt such an extreme interpretation of 
the element of foreseeability. All national laws tend to relax the notion of un-foreseeability to 
one degree or another. Likewise, contractual clauses adopting a force majeure regime are 
inclined not to tighten the degree of required foreseeability.128  
 
Most national laws adopt a relative approach to the concept of force majeure and the 
element of foreseeability. This approach is followed by most long-term investment contracts 
seeking to establish a balance between the stability of the contract and the possibilities of the 
future. The expression of “reasonably foreseeable” seems to be a common instrument to indicate 
this approach. According to this approach, considering the lack of delimitation to be a reason to 
foresee a zonal contestation seems to be a higher threshold than indicated by the clause. This is 
still not a reason to completely eliminate the lack of contestation as an element of appreciation.  
A contestation arising while investing in a non-delimited zone is always a possibility. 
However, the probable scope of the contestation should be a key element to determine whether it 
could have been reasonably expected. For instance, giving the prevalence of the equidistance 
method of delimitation, it is reasonable to assume that an opposite or adjacent state would 
possibly make a claim that corresponds approximatively to the equidistant line. Furthermore, an 
extreme concavity, convexity, or disproportionality of the relevant coasts should indicate that a 
claim from the other state that is shifting accordingly would not be an unreasonable claim. 
Therefore, one can assume that the closer the investment is to the equidistant line, the greater the 
foreseeability of a contestation encompassing the area of the investment.  
 
Some notions of force majeure do not retain the foreseeability element. That approach is 
followed by some contracts.129 The lack of un-foreseeability is not corollary with the event being 
already in place at the moment of the contract. For instance, if two parties agree invest in an 
already disputed zone; they cannot claim the dispute to be a force majeure at a later stage. (They 
can however claim the hazards arising from this dispute as will be addressed later). In such case, 
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However, not requiring foreseeability indicates that the parties have adopted a very low 
threshold in respect to foreseeing the future. Arguably, under a relaxed approach of un-
foreseeability, the fact that a maritime area is not delimited or that it is disputed does not suffice 
as such as an event of force majeure. For instance, In RSM vs Grenada, the investment 
agreement between the parties has been concluded and the dispute between Grenada and its 
neighbors was already known. Applying a foreseeability test using a relative or absolutist 
approach would have resulted in considering the event as foreseeable. However, in this case, the 
parties and the tribunal agreed that the event was tantamount to a force majeure. The force 
majeure clause did not retain foreseeability as an element of force majeure. Despite that, the 
tribunal did not elaborate on the force majeure question, it seems that the Grenadian maritime 
dispute would have satisfied the element of force majeure as required by the contract.  
 
2. “Irresistibility and Control” in Light of the Obligation to Seek an Arrangement 
 
States in dispute shall make every effort to enter into a provisional agreement regarding 
economic exploitation.  The procedural obligation mentioned here is not to actually enter into a 
joint agreement but rather to seek a practical arrangement.130 The Guyana/Suriname tribunal 
defined the content of this obligation as a “conciliatory approach to negotiations”.131 
Accordingly, this obligation would be breached if one state insists on making no concession to 
reach an agreement. However, the obligation remains to seek an agreement in good faith and to 
make every possible effort to achieve that. The tribunal listed examples for what would be 
considered as acts of good faith in the relevant context such as “offering to share the result of the 
exploration…”. 
This obligation provided in articles 74 and 83 of the UNCLOS is an obligation of conduct. 
States involved in a zonal dispute are encouraged to adopt an approach of understanding and 
make a credible effort to reach a mutual understanding upon their different interests. Otherwise, 
the conduct of the state would qualify as illegal. 
 
In this sense, the provisions of articles 74 and 83 of the UNCLOS are coinciding with the 
requirement of “resisting the occurrence of the force majeure” to satisfy the element of 
irresistibility. Articles 74 and 83 are a special legal regime that constitutes a derogation from the 
normal regime governing the exploitation of Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves 
to an exceptional one aiming to coordinate the rights of the contesting states. Consequently, 
acting outside the realm of this regime by breaching its provisions makes the exploitation illegal. 
In order to resist making the exploitation illegal, states are meant to make the effort provided by 
articles 74 and 83.  
 
The tribunal in Guyana vs Suriname considered that Suriname refusal to send a delegation 
to negotiate a practical arrangement with Guyana tantamount to a breach of the obligation in to 
seek the reach of an agreement.132 It also sets examples for conduct that qualifies as a breach of 
the obligation to “seek an arrangement” such as not informing the other state about its activities 
in the contested area.133 The latter argument was brought by Cote Ivoire against Ghana as 
evidence for the latter being in breach of the obligation to seek arrangement.134 The tribunal’s 
reasoning is an example for how a host state might fail to fulfill its obligations in a maritime 
disputed zone, which may lead to render the exploitation unpermissible. In that case, the host 
state might also be found to have failed to fulfill its obligation to resist or avoid the occurrence 
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3. “Impossibility” and Permissible Activities in Disputed Maritime Zones 
 
The consequence of an event claimed to be a force majeure must be to render the 
execution of the relevant obligation impossible. In the realm of maritime contestations, the zonal 
dispute renders some activities un-permissible if performed unilateral by one of the contesting 
states.  
 
a. The Obligation not to Hamper the Reach of a Final Agreement  
 
The substantive obligation regarding the permitted economic activity in disputed areas 
rests on the requirement not to hamper or jeopardize the reaching of a final agreement. The ICJ 
in the Aegean Sea case explained the nature of this obligation as “the requirement not to cause 
irreparable damage”.135 For instance, the exhaustion or the appropriation of the resources of the 
disputed area or the deformation of the natural environment can be qualified as an activity that 
causes irreparable damages.136 These sorts of activities are susceptible of depriving the state to 
which the disputed area would be later gained from exercising its sovereign rights upon it. It is 
not irrational in that case to expect these activities to raise the political tension between the states 
in dispute who would want to preserve their future rights to exploit their natural resources. The 
reasoning of the ICJ was followed later in Guyana vs Cote d’ivoire when the tribunal declared 
the seismic surveys occurring in the disputed area as legally permissible due to their lower 
threshold of impact.137 
 
b. Permissible Unilateral Activities in Disputed Maritime Zones  
 
The limitations of the permitted economic activities in disputed waters does not however 
diminish the scope of the economic activities occurring and susceptible to occurring in disputed 
waters. The offshore oil industry for example heavily relies on exploration activities. It requires 
an advanced level of technology and huge amounts of investments. The information that comes 
out of exploration is of huge value to any upcoming exploitation of a maritime zone. In this 
respect, petroleum contracts usually divide operations to two separate phases.  
The first one is the exploration phase, which takes a long time to be achieved. The second 
is the exploitation phase. In many cases, companies operating in disputed zones make the choice 
of performing the first phase pending the resolution of the dispute.  
 
Another growing field of maritime economic exploitation is the wind energy field. The 
progress realized in the offshore wind farms now permits to establishment of these farms in 
waters beyond the territorial waters where the density of winds is more adequate for the 
functioning of the farms. Moreover, windfarm activities are related to non-living (and non-
exhaustible) resource, which makes them less susceptible to hampering the reach of a final 
agreement. The last decade has also witnessed the rise of a touristic exploitation of maritime 
zones. In the disputed waters of the South China Sea, the Chinese government has built a set of 
installation and artificial islands and it has started to organize a tourism industry around these 
installations and islands.138 
 
 A last example is the fishery industry. Despite being mainly preserved from foreign 
investments in practically all states, few states have started to allow the participation of foreign 
investors in this segment by establishing harvesting factories on the shores to process the 
production of fishing operations. Fisheries being a renewable non-exhaustible resource is also 
less susceptible of being framed of deprivation contesting states from their (possible) future 
sovereign rights.  
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It is hard to establish a complete list of economic activities susceptible to occurring in 
deep maritime zones; however, the above-mentioned examples show that the range and scope of 
activities susceptible of being permitted even in disputed zones is still broad. That is of course 
acknowledging that it is impossible to make a preset list of permissible activities, each case 
should be assessed according to its own individual circumstances. 
 
Accordingly, the primary determination should be whether the economic activity is 
permitted to be conducted unilaterally in a disputed zone. The substantive criteria of such 
determination are whether the activity irreparably damages the environment or the sovereign 
rights of contesting states. A seismic exploration for example should not qualify as hampering 
the reach of a delimitation or agreement since it does not cause damage or change to the 
environment. An exploitation drilling on the other hand could constitute an irreparable damage 
to the contesting state’s sovereign rights if later attributed the disputed zone.  
 
Obviously, force majeure does not necessarily lead to the termination of the obligation or 
of the contract. Rather it may lead only to its suspension if the event has a temporary nature. 
Also, the contract’s suspension or the obligation’s suspension period, requires a reasonable 
envisaged suspension period which does not discharge the contract of its substance and its value 
for the parties. The extent to which the period of suspension is reasonable, is a relative matter 
related to each case. The parties may agree on the periods and the mechanisms of this suspension 
-providing the notice, the agreement and the periods. Further, force majeure might be partial and 
not holistic. Meaning, it may lead to the impossibility of a contractual obligation but necessarily 
to the totality of the contract. In such cases, the force majeure event gives rise to the suspension 
of a part of the obligations for a temporary period that ends with the situation of force majeure. 
 
An example is production-sharing agreements. In this type of agreement, the economic 
operation is divided into two consecutive and consequent phases.139 The first one is the 
exploration phase and the second one is the exploration phase. Despite being economically 
inseparable in certain cases, each phase is susceptible of being performed independently. A rise 
of a temporary force majeure can lead to a suspension of the second phase while permitting the 
first one. It is common that in disputed zones, companies and states start the exploratory 
activities until the prevention to continue the second part ends to gain time and money. In the 
Cote d’ivoire / Ghana dispute for instance, the operator (Tullow Petroleum) and the host state 
(Ghana) decided to continue in its exploratory drillings until the tribunal had rendered its 
decision on delimitation.140 
 
 
4. Maritime Zonal Dispute as a Legal Impossibility  
 
From an abstract perspective, the impossibility arising from a maritime dispute as 
previously presented is a legal impossibility. The notion of impossibility as recognized in 
national laws is flexible enough to encompass cases of impossibility going from acts of god and 
material impossibility to relative impossibility and virtual ones, such as legal impossibility.  
 
Contractual clauses seem to follow a relaxed approach to the notion of impossibility. As 
mentioned above the notions of relative, temporary and partial impossibility are not foreign to 
the construction of force majeure clauses in contracts. Moreover, virtual impossibility or legal 
impossibility seems to be an inherent element of the definition of force majeure in all relevant 
contractual clauses. The lesser degree of resistibility, the lesser the threshold of conduct imposed 
on the parties. The lesser the degree of impossibility leave to assume that force majeure in this 
context encompasses virtual impossibility including economic and legal.  
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The question however is more complicated in the realm of general international law / 
BITs. It is not clear if virtual impossibility falls within the scope of force majeure in customary 
law or not. The reluctance of international tribunals in elaborating on questions like economic 
impossibility makes it complicated to deduce a jurisprudential approach to this subject. The ILC 
draft articles have not made things easier by using the adjective “MATERIAL” to describe the 
required impossibility.  
 
Most BITs do not contain specific provisions regarding force majeure or circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness in general. Hence, the applicability of customary international law, 
which makes it uncertain that, a case of legal impossibility could reach a positive end in a treaty / 
BIT claim. However, the USA model of NPM is quite evocative in this respect. It is possible that 
the illustrative list contained in this BIT could indicate that a circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness in the form of force majeure should be approached according to the characteristics 
of the events provided by the list. Those events are flexible and wide enough to encompass cases 
of virtual impossibility, namely legal impossibility.  
 
 
III. PROVISIONAL MEASURES AND UNFAVORABLE DELIMITATION AS 
EVENTS OF FORCE MAJEURE 
 
 
The precedent part has examined the interaction between each element of the force majeure 
concept and the elements of a maritime zonal dispute. It has shown that a host sate’s ability to 
handle its international maritime disputes is highly dependent on the construction of the force 
majeure concept contained in its investment agreements and contracts. However, practice reveals 
that despite the legal qualifications and the material implications of a maritime contestation, an 
investment might well survive the occurrence of the dispute and continue to operate despite the 
existence of an ongoing dispute. This could be due to several reasons such as the political or 
military implication of the investor’s home state141 or a political environment inciting the parties to 
simply omit to trigger the force majeure clause.142 This does not mean that the investment is 
immune from facing legal implications arising out of the contestation, which can also have the 
effect of crippling the investment and rendering its performance legally impossible. This part 
examine examines the main legal obstacles an investment might confront in disputed zones, 
provisional orders and final delimitation agreement. The peaceful resolution of a maritime dispute 
supposes that states can resolve their disputes through the reliance on a third party’s decision or 
their capability to negotiate a mutual agreement.  
 
This part will demonstrate that rigidly applied, the concept of force majeure can operate as an 
obstacle to the adherence of host states to the mechanisms of peaceful resolution of disputes through 
international instances. It is also susceptible of discouraging states from negotiating delimitation 
agreements in an effective and constructive attitude. However, a contextualist approach to the force 
majeure concept can enhance the chances of accepting the jurisdiction of international tribunals to 
resolve maritime disputes and the reaching of delimitation agreements.  
 
A. Provisional Measures  
 
As the appellation indicates, provisional measures aim to ensure that a provisional 
regime protects the potential rights of the parties.  This purpose coincides with that of articles 
74(3) and 83(3) of the UNCLOS, the similarities between the substantive conditions of 
provisional measures and the substantive obligations of states in disputed maritime zones are 
striking.  
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The function of provisional measures in the realm of a dispute regarding the sovereign 
rights of states in a contested zone is to recalibrate state’s behavior in accordance with their 
obligations prescribed by articles 74(3) and 83(3). The obligation of states not to hamper or 
jeopardize the reaching of a final agreement have been extensively interpreted by tribunals as 
an obligation to refrain from inflicting irreparable damage to sovereign rights of other states.143  
The “irreparable damage” criteria as elaborated in the Aegean case144  explains the authority of 
the findings of the Aegean Sea case tribunal.145 
 
The previous assessment indicates that from a substantive standpoint, the conditions 
upon which a provisional measure / order would qualifies as a force majeure are not different 
than what was examined earlier.  
 
However, assessing the predictability of a provisional measure can be more complicated 
than assessing the predictability of a contestation. In addition to the substantive criteria 
addressed above, the question of the jurisdiction of a tribunal or instance to issue a provisional 
order is crucial to determine the predictability of such a measure. Generally, the lack of 
competence to issue a provisional order reduces the predictability of such order. On the other 
hand, the existence of a competent instance having jurisdiction to issue a provisional order 
enhance the possibility and predictability element.  
 
However, despite being portrayed as a legal body heavily drawn onto compulsory 
jurisdiction146, the jurisdictional schema to order a provisional measure in the realm of a 
maritime dispute entails complications that deserve to be examined.  
 
The obligations of conduct in respect to the occurrence of force majeure is also relevant 
in cases where the host state accepts the jurisdiction of the tribunal subsequent to the 
occurrence of the dispute. The force majeure event cannot be triggered by the behavior of the 
claimant party. The question that arises is whether a provisional measure hampering the 
investment is attributable to the host state, and therefore prevents it from claiming force 
majeure because it has accepted the tribunal’s jurisdiction.  
 
1. The Function and Purpose of Provisional Measures  
 
Article 290 of the UNCLOS provides that “If a dispute has been duly submitted to a 
court or tribunal which considers that prima facie it has jurisdiction under this Part or Part XI, 
section 5, the court or tribunal may prescribe any provisional measures which it considers 
appropriate under the circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the 
dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment, pending the final decision.”147 
 
As indicated, the main purpose of the provisional measures is to preserve the rights 
claimed by a party when according to the circumstances; the nonprescription of these measures 
can impair these rights or leads to the aggravation of the dispute.148 Provisional measures are 
ought to guarantee the serenity of an international adjudication by assuring the parties that their 
claimed rights will not become impossible to enjoy by the time a decision is made149 or that a 
party might not instaur a “fait accompli” during the procedure.150 
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The provisional measures prescribed by a tribunal can take the form of a prohibition to 
conduct certain activities151 , to suspend ongoing activities152, to refrain from divulging 
information related to the ongoing activities to third parties153  or to limit activities.154 The key 
question upon which the nature of the provisional measures depends is what harm the claimant 
is afraid of suffering155 and the adequacy of the requested provisional measure to deal with this 
potential harm. For instance, in Cote D’Ivoire vs Ghana the claimant argued that it could suffer 
considerable and irreparable damage if it cannot conserve the exclusivity of the information 
obtained from the exploration activities, which led the tribunal to prescribe a prohibition upon 
Ghana to divulge the results of the exploration operation.156  
 
2. The Question of Jurisdiction to Order a Provisional Measure and Predictability  
 
A preliminary requirement to the admissibility of a provisional measure request is the 
existence of a dispute that is duly submitted to the court or the tribunal. By consequence, a 
request of a provisional measure is organically related to the existence of a dispute duly 
submitted regardless of the stage of the proceedings.157 The word “dispute” has a double 
meaning in this respect. The First is the legal sense of the word dispute.158 Accordingly, a 
litigatory relationship must exists between the parties according to the provisions of the 
convention and the statute of the court or tribunal. This relationship is established based on the 
prior ratification either of UNCLOS or by special agreement.  Second, there must be 
convergence on the interpretation of the provisions of the convention. A dispute related to the 
interpretation or application of a body of law other than UNCLOS would fail to qualify as a 
“dispute” in the sense of article 290 unless an incidental jurisdiction is established.  
 
The second sense overlaps in some respect with the condition of prima facie jurisdiction. 
The court or tribunal must satisfy that it has a prima facie jurisdiction upon the dispute 
submitted to it. It has been argued that the threshold of jurisdiction in the realm of provisional 
measures is lower that what is required in general jurisdiction.159 Therefore, it is not 
unconceivable that a court declares a prima facie jurisdiction to find later that it lacks 
jurisdiction to hear the dispute.160  
 
UNCLOS has a clear penchant for compulsory jurisdiction.161 However, exceptions to 
the compulsory jurisdiction have been reiterated in article 290 in order to deflate a state’s 
reservations to a constraining regime. Accordingly, disputes about delimitation and the 
management of living resources are excluded from the compulsory regime instaured by article 
290.  
 
The recurrent question for the purpose of this study is the question of jurisdiction to hear 
a case concerning the sovereign rights entitled by articles 74 and 83. If the host state is a 
member of UNCLOS and has declared an exemption from the compulsory jurisdiction of 
delimitation cases, a tribunal constituted under UNCLOS would still have jurisdiction to hear a 
dispute related to the exercise of sovereign rights in a disputed zone, and potentially the 
jurisdiction to order provisional measures.  
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A zonal maritime dispute is primarily a dispute between states on the interpretation or 
the application of the provisions of articles 74(1) and 83(1) UNCLOS. This dispute entails and 
encompasses complications regarding the management of state’s sovereign rights in the 
disputed zone, the latter not being necessarily addressed by the exception to compulsory 
jurisdiction. This corollary between multiple (issues) creates doubts as to whether a tribunal 
would have jurisdiction over a dispute covered by the “exempting “clause that is linked to 
another non-exempted dispute. 
  
The case law provides us with contradictory indications in this respect. In the Chagos 
MPA case, the tribunal adopted a progressive approach to the interpretation of article 297(3) 
which excluded the management of living resource from compulsory settlement,  by ruling that 
the question of fishery management despite being initially outside the scope of compulsory 
jurisdiction, could well fall within this scope as an environmental dispute according to article 
297(1).162 A similar reasoning was adopted in the South China Sea case where the tribunal163 
responded to the Philippine request to decide whether low tide elevation rocks would qualify as 
an island capable of generating an EEZ in the sense of UNCLOS. Despite being related to the 
maritime delimitation dispute of the parties which should be outside the scope of compulsory 
jurisdiction  and despite that the qualification of “island”  would have a direct impact of the 
parties maritime claims,  the tribunal considered that Philippines request was built upon a 
dispute regarding the interpretation of an article of the convention that is not exempted from 
compulsory jurisdiction, regardless of the effects that would have on the delimitation dispute164 
( delimitation and historic titles). 
 
The approach followed by the tribunals indicates that the jurisdiction of the tribunal is 
assessed based on the source of the legal claim or dispute regardless of its link with a 
potentially (exempted) dispute. Accordingly, the link between the claim and the (exempted) 
dispute should not prevent the tribunal from ruling on the case.  
 
In the case of articles 74(3) and 83(4), it is clear that a dispute regarding the management 
of state’s sovereign rights in a disputed zone is directly related to a dispute regarding the 
interpretation or application of maritime delimitation rules.  
 
A contractionist approach entails putting these kinds of disputes within the scope of 
delimitation disputes and prohibiting the jurisdiction to rule over such disputes, hence 
decreasing the predictability of the occurrence of a provisional measure.  
 
An expansionist approach on the other hand would argue that the sovereign rights of 
states in maritime zones are governed by articles 74(3) and 83(3), which separates their origin 
from that of delimitation provisions originating from articles 74(1) and 83(1). Moreover, a 
decision on the management of sovereign rights in a disputed zone cannot be said to influence 
the outcome of the dispute. As established, the regime managing the sovereign rights in a 
disputed zone is inherently of a provisional nature. The tacit or explicit arrangement and the 
policy of states regarding the exercise of their sovereign rights should not have an effect of the 
final delimitation. Articles 74(3) and 83(3) clearly provide that provisional arrangement are 
without effect on the final delimitation. Moreover, the jurisprudence is settled on the rule 
saying that resource and their management are not an indicator as such to the existence of an 
agreement onto a maritime boundary.  
 
 In assessing the “jurisdiction” issue in respect to predictability, it is arguable that the 
ratification of UNCLOS makes the occurrence of a provisional measure an anticipated legal 
event. The declaration of a host state regarding exceptions to compulsory jurisdiction is not a 
reason for diminishing the probability of such an event to happen. The degree of predictably of 
a legal event such as a provisional measure would depend on the requirements of the governing 
law of the investment. Unpredictability is enhanced if the host state is not a signatory of the 
UNCLOS.  
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The degree of unpredictability decreases if the host state is a signatory of the UNCLOS, 
the declaration of an exception (of delimitation disputes) should not have an effect in this 
respect. Finally, the occurrence of a provisional measure becomes highly predictable if the host 
state has made no reservations to the compulsory jurisdiction in the LOSC.  
 
3. Subsequent Jurisdiction and the Element of Exteriority  
 
In some cases, the investment might take place in a host state that is not bound by the 
provisions of UNCLOS, yet at later stage, the host state might accept the jurisdiction of an 
international tribunal-giving rise to a provisional measure hampering the investment. This is 
the case in the Ghana vs Cote d’Ivoire dispute. At the time of the conclusion of several 
contracts between foreign investors and Ghana, the latter has previously triggered (the 
exceptionality clause) in 15 December 2009 to remove delimitation disputes from the scope of 
compulsory jurisdiction.165 However, in December 2014 Ghana signed a special agreement 
with Cote d’ivoire accepting to submit their maritime dispute to a special chamber of ITLOS. 
Later on, the tribunal ordered a moratorium on Ghana’s activities in the disputed area upon 
Ivorian request of provisional measure. The tribunal’s order has led to the suspension of 
several ongoing activity occurring in the contracted area.166 The tribunal’s order being a 
temporary undetermined legal obstacle before the continuity of the investments could have 
been the basis of a force majeure claim by any of the parties if it met the relevant requirements. 
However, the problem arising from this specific situation it the question of whether the 
provisional order can be considered the result of Ghana’s conduct and therefore preventing 
Ghana from claiming force majeure.  
 
It is a general characteristic of force majeure that it should not be the result of a party’s 
conduct. However, the degree of attributability of the force majeure event to a party’s conduct 
varies from a clause to another.  
 
As illustrated earlier, an absolutist approach to exteriority means that the party should 
not have contributed to the occurrence of the force majeure event nor directly neither partially. 
Accordingly, it is possible to argue that Ghana would have been unable to claim force majeure 
in respect to the provisional order of the court.  
 
A relaxed approach diminishing the required threshold such as the contract’s clause 
requiring the force majeure to be beyond the “reasonable control” of the parties should result in 
a different outcome. Accordingly, the conduct of the parties should be assessed objectively 
taking into consideration the normal expected conduct in a given situation. The effect of the 
contribution of this conduct in the occurrence of the force majeure event should be attenuated 
by the reasonability and normality of the conduct. In the Ghana example, the question is 
whether the Ghana agreement to peacefully resolve the maritime dispute with Cote d’ivoire 
through international adjudication is beyond the normal conduct states are supposed to follow 
in this context and should the presence of foreign investment in the disputed area be an 
obstacle before Ghana opting for such adjudication.  
 
The tribunal in RSM vs Grenada has addressed the question of resorting to litigation in 
the context of assessing Grenada’s conduct regarding force majeure. RSM claimed that 
Grenada failed to adopt the proper conduct towards the removal of the force majeure by 
refusing to bring Trinidad and Venezuela to litigation. Grenada on the other hand countered 
RSMs claim by emphasizing both legal and political reasons according to which litigation 
seemed unreasonable from the Grenadian view. The tribunal accepted Grenada’s claim, 
affirming that resorption to international adjudication isn’t an international obligation and that 
the appreciation of such policy shouldn’t be transferred from the discretion of the sovereign 
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state to a private party. Moreover, the tribunal seems to have acknowledged the reasonability of 
Grenada’s omission to resort to litigation for reasons of public policy of the state. 167 
 
Contrarily, it can be said that the choice of a sovereign state to settle its disputes by the 
means permitted by international law including litigation seems like a normal conduct. 
Assuming that the maritime dispute originated from different interpretations of legal and 
factual rules, it is assumed that both contesting states have good reasons to believe in their 
righteous entitlement to their claimed zone. It also seems a reasonable conduct to try to 
establish these entitlements through international adjudication as a mean of the peaceful 
settlement of disputes. Accordingly, a contextualist interpretation of the force majeure concept 
should assume that the parties have anticipated the possibility of an international adjudication.  
 
 
B. Unfavorable Delimitation  
 
The regime governing the exploitation of disputed maritime zones is meant to be 
temporary, hence the appellation “provisional”. Even though maritime delimitation can take 
decades to be achieved and even though states might opt to instaure a provisional arrangement 
that could last for decades, maritime boundary disputes ought to be resolved. The delimitation 
of a disputed maritime zone might become fatal to an investment if the delimitation turns out to 
be unfavorable to the host state by transferring its location to the definitive maritime zones of 
the contesting state.168 On the one hand, the lack of a contractual framework between the 
investor and the contesting state deprive the former from an elementary layer of protection as a 
foreign investor. On the other hand, presuming that a BIT exists between the investor’s home 
state and its new host, it is doubtful that a BIT would encompass investments made in the 
territory of the contesting state of a disputed maritime zone. Therefore, it is also possible that 
the investment also loses the protection of this international instrument. The problem is more 
acute if the hampering of the investment in such case is found to be due to the conduct of the 
initial host sate by virtue of a delimitation agreement transferring the investment to the 
geographical scope of the contesting state. 
 
Delimitation agreements usually follow the criteria found in adjudicational delimitation. 
Accordingly, the equidistance approach occupies a major position as to the guidelines of 
delimitation agreements especially in the case of opposite coasts.169 Other geographical factors 
have minorly influenced the delimitation agreements such as the configuration of coasts170, 
proportionality,171the presence of islands,172 straight baselines173 geological factors,174 . Non-
geographical factors such as economic factors have also minorly influenced delimitation 
agreement. 
 
 It would be unrealistic to think that the presence of confirmed or potential resources is 
absent from the background of a delimitation negotiation, the whole purpose of maritime 
delineation being the management of natural resources. Accordingly, there is no reason to 
assume that the presence of resources has not played a role in the negotiations that preceded the 
agreement despite not being a legal criterion to delimitation. Interestingly thought, despite 
being affirmatively not a factor of the law of maritime delimitation, the presence of natural 
resources has directly and explicitly determined the frame of some delimitation agreements. 
The presence of an investment in a given maritime area is probably an indication of the 
presence of valuable resources; it is therefore not strange that a negotiation on delimitation 
encompasses the invested area.  
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Moreover, the complexity and longevity of maritime border disputes can be an incentive 
for states involved in the dispute to make concessions from their original positions in return for 
the resolving of the dispute 
 
1. Unfavorable Delimitation and Foreseeability  
 
Most maritime delimitations occur through the process of agreement. Delimitation 
through agreement might enjoy a certain preference for states who are not keen on involving 
third parties regarding the settlement of their maritime boundaries.175 Delimitation through 
adjudication might also be perceived as unpredictable and uncontrollable in cases where the 
application of delimitation rules do not lead to a clear cut result in demarcating the contesting 
state’s claims.176 In fact, articles 74 (1) and 83(1) clearly emphasize the prominence of 
agreements as the primary mean of boundary dispute settlement.    
 
As one commentator has observed, one possible explanation for the prominence of 
delimitation agreements in force, is the easiness of these cases in comparison with those that 
have not been settled yet.177 Accordingly, it can be argued that the easiness and clearness of a 
maritime zonal dispute is more susceptible of being resolved by means of agreement, hence 
increasing the predictability of the occurrence of a negotiation process and potentially an 
agreement. This remains depending on the circumstances surrounding each dispute, which can 
negate this effect.  
 
Another element that might indicate the possibility of an engagement in negotiations to 
delimit disputed maritime boundaries is the lack of jurisdiction of a competent instance to 
adjudicate onto the dispute. Dispute settlement through adjudication is one of the means to 
resolve maritime boundaries disputes. Its absence as a viable alternative by the parties 
enhances the predictability of the parties resolving to negotiations and agreement. A nuanced 
view should also be taken in consideration if the surrounding circumstances invites it. 
 
The predictability of the transfer of sovereignty as an element of force majeure becomes 
more persistent if the investment is established in a disputed zone where the host state is 
engaged in a negotiation process with a contesting state at the time the investment is made. 
Unless otherwise proven, the ongoing negotiations presume the host state’s readiness to draw 
back from its initial claim. Accordingly, the transfer of sovereignty should become more or less 
predictable with an investment established in the near proximity of the equidistance line. For 
instance, both Guyana and Venezuela have been engaged in a long-standing maritime dispute 
going back to 1899. The negotiations between the two contesting states has been on and off for 
nearly fifty years.178 If an investor decided to establish the investment in near proximity of the 
median line separating the contesting claims knowing the existence of negotiations, it can be 
assumed that the investor has born the risk of an unfavorable delimitation.179 
 
2. Delimitation Agreements and “Sphere of Control” 
 
Generally, the irresistibility of a legal impossibility constituting a force majeure resides 
primarily in the fact that the occurrence of the legal situation (promulgation of a law, legal 
situation) is independent from the party’s (will) and that the parties have no means to overcome 
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As presented in the case of provisional measures and the occurrence of a maritime 
contestation, the source of the legal regime and its effects emanates from a body of laws that 
are initially independent from the parties will. In some cases, the means of overcoming the 
legal impossibility resulting from such cases exist but the law that imposes the impossibility is 
independent of the parties will.  
 
The situation is different in case of a delimitation agreement since the legal event in 
question such as the transfer of sovereign rights is the act of the host state / party and therefore 
attributed to it. A delimitation agreement depends of the choice and appreciation of the state of 
its own interests, there is room for arguing that in such case a state / party should bear the 
consequences of its sovereign actions in respect to a third parties’ interest.  
 
However, such interpretation of the notions of irresistibility and control can hamper the 
objectives of articles 74 and 83. The interim regime governing the exploitation of resources in 
disputed areas in meant to balance between the need to use resources and the peaceful 
settlement maritime disputes. Accordingly, the exploitation of resources should not become a 
reason for contesting state’s inability to reach a final agreement. It is presumed that a 
negotiation in good faith entails party’s willingness to abandon their initial positions to reach a 
middle ground of agreement. As the ICJ provided in North Sea case, the parties of a 
negotiation “are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the negotiations are 
meaningful, which will not be the case when either of them insists upon its own position 
without contemplating any modification of it”180 
 
 It is obvious that the presence of resources can be a determinant factor in the realm of 
maritime delimitation agreements. The economic harm that a host state / party may encounter 
in the event of a transfer of sovereign rights might act as a deterrent for the state to negotiate 
with a readiness to give up some of its initial position. The whole purpose of negotiation in that 
case becomes frustrated. Moreover, it might be in the best interest of the host state to accept a 
concession of a disputed zone in exchange for an equivalent concession from the contesting 
state or for the sake of reaching a final agreement pursuant to the objectives of UNCLOS.  
 
A more relaxed interpretation of the notion of (irresistibility and control) is envisage-
able according to the usage of the wording (reasonable control) in long-term investment 
contracts as a required threshold. The reasonability of the state/party’s conduct will of course 
remain an objective question to be appreciated according to the circumstances of each case. 
However, taking into consideration the characteristic and complexity of a given maritime 
dispute might provide a basis for arguing the reasonability of the host state’s conduct.  
 
3. Unfavorable Delimitation and the Element of Irresistibility  
 
If an event of force majeure occurs, the parties are under an obligation to overcome the 
effects of the event qualified as such. Some agreements reiterate this obligation by providing 
for detailed provisions on the way and means parties should overcome the effects of the force 
majeure. Even if an agreement omits to explicitly provide for this obligation, it remains the 
positive façade of the notion of irresistibility. Accordingly, it has been ruled that the blockade 
of the Suez Canal could not be considered as a force majeure because the transporter could 
overcome this event by using another maritime path despite being more onerous.181  
 
Practice has shown that a delimitation agreement transferring the sovereign rights of a 
maritime zone does not necessarily entail the ignoration of economic resource and interests of 
private third parties. In the 1909 Grisbadarna case  , the Permanent Court of arbitration in the 
maritime delimitation between Sweden and Norway opted for a shift of the median line 
between the two parties, taking in consideration the presence of third parties interest that would 
be transferred to Norway if the median line is confirmed according to the latter’s proposal.182 
This jurisprudence has been abandoned since and it is settled now that the presence of resource 
is not as such a legal factor of maritime delimitation.  
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Despite economic resources having a minor impact on delimitation agreements in 
general,183 the presence of economic resources and the interests of third parties have been taken 
in consideration in some maritime delimitation agreements in several forms.184  For instance, 
the 1988 agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf between Sweden and the Soviet 
Union if each party is entitled to a specific tonnage of fisheries in area falling within the 
jurisdiction of each other party.185 In 1993, as a deblocage of their long lasting maritime 
dispute186, Senegal and Guinea Bissau opted for establishing a joint development venture to 
explore and exploit the resources of their disputed maritime zone.187 The agency created by this 
agreement has been given exclusive titles to the resources of the disputed zone as well an 
independent legal personality. 
 Finally in the 2000 Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea agreement concerning their maritime 
boundaries,188 it is provided that if the maritime boundary “ run through any field of 
hydrocarbon deposits so that part of the field lies on the Nigerian side of the boundary and part 
lies on the Equatorial Guinea side, the Contracting Parties shall seek to reach appropriate 
unitization arrangements for each such field”.189 It is also provided that “ the Contracting 
Parties shall authorize the relevant government entities in association with the relevant 
concession holders to establish appropriate unitization and other arrangements to enable this 
area to be developed in a commercially feasible manner”190 
 
As shown from the preceding examples, the submission of an investment to the scope of 
the sovereignty of a contesting state (potentially hampering the investment) is not a fatality in 
respect of maritime delimitation. It exists several approaches to provide the investment a 
proper protection and to protect the interests of private parties. The examples of the Senegalese 
agreements show that the parties haven’t necessarily put the accent onto a definitive 
delimitation which facilitated the creation of the joint venture. However, in the Nigerian 
agreement, the parties have opted for a definitive demarcation of their maritime boundaries. 
Nevertheless, that did not prevent them from guaranteeing the stability of the private interests 
lying on the border line as explicitly mentioned in their agreement. Accordingly, it can be 
argued that the impact of an unfavorable delimitation can be resisted or avoided by means 
already experimented in international practice. The obligation to resist or avoid the effect of an 
unfavorable delimitation remains however an obligation of conduct, each case according to the 
surrounding circumstances  
 
4. Unfavorable Delimitation as an Event of Force Majeure   
 
A rigid interpretation of the concept of force majeure in the realm of maritime 
delimitation agreements could hamper states ability and margin of maneuver to conclude such 
agreements.  
 
Rigidly approached, the outcome of a boundary delimitation is initially dependent on the 
host state’s will either by reaching an agreement or by leaving the faith of the dispute to a third 
party. According to this interpretation, there is no reason to assume that the host state accepted 
the establishment of a private investment while intending to concede its maritime claim. 
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 The host state’s acceptance of a private investment in its claimed maritime zone should 
be a decreasing factor to the probability and predictability of the former to concede its claimed 
zone. Reaching a delimitation agreement is not an obligation under international law. 
Accordingly, the conclusion and the outcome of the agreement are not only within the control 
of the host state but the effects resulting from the agreement could be attributed to the host 
state’s conduct. 
 
On the other hand, a relaxed approach to the concept of force majeure would enhance 
state’s ability to balance between the purposes of peacefully settling its maritime disputes and 
the preservation of investor’s interests. As shown, a relaxed interpretation of the concept of 
force majeure still retains a degree of predictability to the host state’s conduct. It also still 
requires that the circumstances surrounding a given dispute reasonably justify the conclusion of 
an unfavorable agreement. Moreover, several mechanisms exist to protect the integrity of the 
investment in case of an unfavorable delimitation. This relaxed approach is sustained by the 





The concept of force majeure is a flexible concept. It is susceptible to being narrowed down 
to a very limited scope that encompasses a limited number of events, but it is also susceptible of 
being broadened to encompass unlimited possibilities. The scope of the force majeure concept 
depends on whether it is built upon a subjective or an objective approach. The more subjective and 
contextualist it is, the more ability it has, to encompass events which would not traditionally fall 
within its scope. As a doctrine construed to protect the debtor from perturbations susceptible of 
occurring during the contractual relationship, it is in the interest of the debtor to widen the scope of 
this doctrine. 
 
The main problem this research examined is the problem of the revocation of a state’s 
permission for a foreign investment to operate in a subsequently disputed maritime zone. In this 
schema, the state is the debtor of the obligation to permit the investment to operate. This research 
established that to determine if a maritime contestation is tantamount to an event of force majeure, 
the dispute must be deconstructed and analyzed according to the multiple elements of the concept of 
force majeure. Once this is done, the outcome of this equation would vary according to the 
approach followed in evaluating whether a force majeure exists or not. An objective analysis of the 
concept of force majeure would probably tighten up its scope and may potentially be a burden on 
state’s margin of maneuver to handle its maritime disputes.  
 
The collision between the necessities of foreign investments protection on the one hand and 
the peaceful resolution of maritime disputes on the other may hamper the development of disputed 
maritime zones as conceived by the UNCLOS III. However, practice have shown that international 
contracts followed by international investment agreements tend to adopt a subjective approach to 
the force majeure concept. Accordingly, the concept of force majeure starts to encompass situations 
that would not have normally been encompassed by the objective approach. Hence, giving host 
states more freedom in claiming force majeure for the purpose of peacefully settling their maritime 
dispute, abiding with judicial orders and entering into maritime delimitation agreements. In the 
meantime, investors are not left without safety measures to cope with the expansion of host state’s 
ability to claim force majeure. The outcome of a successful force majeure invocation is not 
necessarily the end of the investment. 
 
Partial and temporary suspension of the agreement is well elaborated in national, international 
law, international contracts usually contain elaborated procedures governing the post-force majeure 
phase allowing them to enter into a renegotiation of their agreements and States are still expected to 
look after the investment’s interest in case of a delimitation agreements. It is therefore safe to argue 
that the balance or the imbalance in the host state – investor relation within a force majeure schema 
is highly dependent on the approach taken to address the force majeure concept.  
